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Abstract 
In an earlier paper, a method called One-class Classification using 
Length statistics of Emerging Patterns (OCLEP) was introduced. This 
paper presents OCLEP+, which is a modified version of OCLEP, for 
constructing one-class anomaly detection and intrusion detection systems. 
OCLEP+ mainly differs from OCLEP in what length statistics is used   
and how the length statistics is derived. OCLEP+ has these main features: 
“one-class training,” “not using model/signature” (making it hard for 
adversaries to attack), “not using distance metrics”, and “using length 
statistics of patterns” (making it a robust method).  OCLEP+ can be used 
for one-class intrusion detection, one-class anomaly detection, one-class 
masquerader detection, and one-class outlier detection. Experiments show 
that OCELP+ is more accurate than OCLEP and one-class SVM on the 
NSL-KDD dataset. 
Keywords: Anomaly detection, intrusion detection, outlier detection, length, 
pattern, emerging pattern, jumping emerging pattern. 
 
1 Introduction 
Intrusion detection plays an important role for ensuring the security of various 
protected systems. Intrusion detection is a special case of anomaly detection, 
and it is also related to novelty detection and outlier detection. Very often 
∗Citation: Guozhu Dong and Sai Kiran Pentukar. OCLEP+: One-class intrusion detection 
using minimal length of emerging patterns. CSE Tech Report, Wright State University, 2018. 
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the underlying data for intrusion detection have high dimensions and perhaps 
also contain many categorical attributes. Many existing intrusion detection and 
anomaly detection approaches directly rely on the use of distance metrics, while 
some others indirectly rely on distance metrics (e.g. they use models that 
involve attribute-wise differences between data points). These approaches may 
perform poorly due to pitfalls of distance metrics in high dimensional spaces 
(see Section 2) and due to the existence of categorical attributes. 
In an earlier paper [6], a method called One-class Classification using Length 
statistics of Emerging Patterns (OCLEP) was introduced. 
This paper presents OCLEP+, which is a modified version of OCLEP, for 
constructing one-class intrusion detection and anomaly detection systems. OCLEP+ 
mainly differs from OCLEP in what length statistics is used and how it is de-      
rived. OCLEP+ retains the main features of OCLEP, including “one-class 
training”, “not model or signature based” (making it hard for adversaries to 
attack), ”using length statistics of patterns” (making it a robust method), and 
“not using distance metrics.” OCLEP+ and OCLEP can both be used for 
one-class masquerader detection, one-class intrusion detection, one-class 
anomaly detection, and one-class outlier detection. The patterns identified for 
given instances predicted to be intruders can be used to explain why predicted 
intruders are intruders. Experiments show that OCELP+ is more accurate than 
OCLEP and one-class SVM on the NSL-KDD datasets. 
Organizationally, the paper first gives some general background for intrusion 
detection, followed by some preliminaries. Then it presents the emerging pattern 
length based method OCLEP+ for intrusion detection. Next it reports 
experimental evaluation of the method on a public dataset which has been 
widely used to evaluate intrusion detection systems. Finally some concluding 
remarks are given. 
 
2 Background on Intrusion Detection and Anomaly 
Detection 
Since intrusion detection is a special case of anomaly detection (especially when 
the training data are all from one class), we present some background on both 
topics. 
Anomaly detection is concerned with identifying anomalies with respect to 
some given dataset. Anomaly detection can be treated as two-class problems 
and one-class problems. In the two-class case, a dataset containing two classes, 
representing normal instances and anomaly instances respectively, is given to 
train the anomaly detection system. For the one-class case, a dataset containing 
just one class (representing the normal instances) is given to train the system. 
One-class anomaly detection is also called outlier detection. The one-class case 
for anomaly detection is more challenging than the two-class case. On the other 
hand, it is easier to use as the training data for one-class is easier to obtain, 
and detection systems based on one-class training data can be deployed 
earlier in the life-cycle of the application. 
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For network and system security, anomaly detection includes intrusion 
detection and masquerader detection. The former is about detecting intruders 
to a protected system, while the latter is about identifying abusers inside a 
protected system who use privileges of others through non-authorized means. 
Reference [4] gives a survey of the machine learning and data mining 
literature on intrusion detection. It indicates that most methods are 
classification model based methods, although clustering based methods have 
also been studies. A notable statement from the paper is the following: 
“Unfortunately, the methods that are the most effective for cyber 
applications have not been established; and given the richness and complexity 
of the methods, it is impossible to make one recommendation for each 
method, based on the type of attack the system is supposed to detect.” 
Reference [16] provides a survey on outlier detection.   From this survey, one 
can see that most existing outlier detection approaches rely on the use of distance 
metrics, while some others rely on models that involve the use of data- point 
differences.   Reference [3] points out certain pitfalls of distance metrics    in high 
dimensional space, asking the question “When is ‘nearest neighbor’ 
meaningful?” Reference [15] contains a discussion of some more recent outlier 
detection algorithms. Reference [1] discusses challenges to outlier detection in 
high dimensional space. 
 
3 Preliminaries on Jumping Emerging Patterns 
 
 
We first give some relevant basics on patterns. An item is a single-attribute 
condition of the form “A = a” if A is a categorical attribute, or “v1 ≤ A < v2”, 
where v1 and v2 are constants, if A is a numerical attribute. A pattern or itemset 
is a finite set of items. An instance x is said to satisfy, or match, a pattern P , 
denoted by x = P , if x satisfies every item/condition in P . 
Given a dataset D, the matching data of P in D is given by mds(P, D) = 
{x ∈ D | x |= P }.  The support of P  in D is supp(P, D) =  |mds(P,D)| . 
In this paper, we use a special kind of jumping emerging patterns [9]. Here, 
one of the classes contains just one instance. 
 
Given a data instance t and a dataset D, a jumping emerging pattern 
for t is a pattern P  that occurs in t  but not in any instance in D.  P  
is referred to as a JEP for t vs D. 
 
To reduce redundancies, we limit ourselves to minimal1 jumping emerging pat- 
terns for t vs D. 
For example, for t = 1234 (representing {1,2,3,4}) and D = {3456, 2479, 2358}, 
there are two minimal JEPs, namely 1 and 234. 
1Minimal in the set containment sense 
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The discussion below also refers to the general concept of emerging patterns, 
which we define in the remainder of this section. Let D1 and D2 be two data 
groups. The growth rate2 [9, 10] of a pattern X from Di to Dj (i, j ∈ {1, 2} and 
i /= j) is 
 
growthRate(X, Dj ) = supp(X, Dj)
 
/ supp(X, Di). 
      
 
For the case supp(X, Di) = 0, it is customary to 
• define growthRate(X, Dj) to be 0 if supp(X, Dj) = supp(X, Di) = 0, and 
• define growthRate(X, Dj) to be ∞ if supp(X, Dj) > 0 and supp(X, Di) = 0. 
Given a growth-rate threshold ρ > 0, a pattern X is a ρ-emerging pattern for 
data group Dj if growthRate(X, Dj) ≥ ρ. If X is an emerging pattern for Dj,  
then Dj is the home data group (also called target data group) and the other 
dataset is the opposing data group (also called background data group) of X. An 
emerging pattern having growthRate(X, Dj) = ∞ is called a jumping emerging 
pattern for Dj. 
 
4 The OCLEP+ Method 
The length of a pattern is defined as the number of single-attribute conditions 
contained in the pattern. For example, the length of ace (={a, c, e}) is 3. 
Below we use N to denote a training dataset of normal instances. 
 
4.1 An Observation on Emerging Pattern Length 
Normally one would use emerging patterns to differentiate instances in different 
classes. It turns out that one can also use emerging patterns to differentiate 
instances that are from a common class. One would likely observe the following 
difference: 
The emerging patterns differentiating instances of different classes 
are often short, whereas the emerging patterns differentiating in- 
stances of a common class are often long. The former are typically 
much shorter than the latter. 
Experiments [6] on the Mushroom data from the UCI Repository confirmed 
this observation: The average length of minimal jumping emerging patterns 
differentiating instances of a common class is 7.78, and the average length of 
minimal jumping emerging patterns differentiating instances of different classes 
is 3.03. The experiments involved repeated mining of minimal jumping emerging 
patterns that occur in an instance but not occurring in small random set of 
several hundreds of instances. 
2One may use Laplacian smoothing to change to very large numbers while still having 
higher growthRate values for jumping emerging patterns than for all other emerging patterns. 
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To get a rough idea of what the above observation means, consider this ex- 
ample. To differentiate residential buildings and agricultural crops one would 
use emerging patterns of length 1, e.g. crops grow but buildings do not. To 
differentiate one residential building from a collection of other residential 
buildings one may need to use emerging patterns of length 3 or larger. This is 
due to the fact that each single-attribute condition satisfied by one residential 
building is also satisfied by many other residential buildings; only 
combinations of several single-attribute conditions can indicate the uniqueness 
of a particular residential building. 
The intrusion detection method discussed below makes use of this length 
difference. 
 
4.2 What Emerging Patterns to Use and Their Mining 
To use the observation above in an emerging pattern length based intrusion 
detection method, three issues need to be resolved: 
(a) What kinds of emerging patterns should be used? 
(b) Should we use the eager approach or lazy approach to mine the needed 
emerging patterns? 
(c) How to compute the needed emerging patterns to increase robustness and 
efficiency of the intrusion detection system? 
Recall that we consider one-class training based intrusion detection – we only 
have one training dataset N representing the set of normal instances. Moreover, 
the number of training instances can be very large (e.g. > 10, 000). 
The discussion in Section 4.1 already hinted that we need to differentiate in- 
stances of a common class as well as differentiating instances of different classes. 
In particular, when predicting if a new instance is an intruder, we need to mine 
emerging patterns that differentiate this instance from the normal instances. In 
the training process, we must utilize the training data to gather needed 
information for use by the system to predict on new instances. Combining 
these, we see that we need to mine emerging patterns that differentiate an 
instance from a set of instances. So one possible (and our chosen) answer to 
Question (a) is: Use jumping emerging patterns that occur in one particular 
instance but not in a set of normal instances. 
Because of the above choice, we need to use the lazy learning approach, 
where we mine patterns after we see the test instance. Moreover, in this lazy 
approach we only want to use statistics obtained in the training process, and 
we do not want to store/use all the emerging patterns mined in that process. 
(There are too many such patterns.) 
For efficiency reasons, the emerging patterns to be used should be computed 
quickly to make the intrusion detection system efficient to use. It is also desirable 
to find ways to increase the robustness of the system. Our answer to Question 
(c) is to use the BorderDiff algorithm [9] repeatedly in a 1-vs-m fashion:  one 
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instance t vs a random sample M from N of some suitable size m. This helps 
improve on both robustness and efficiency. By having m to be a reasonably small 
number we get efficiency. By finding jumping emerging patters that occur in t but 
not in M for multiple M, the corresponding derived statistics on the patterns 
becomes more stable. 
We  note  that  jumping  emerging  patterns  mined  from  one  particular  “t  vs 
M ” may not be jumping emerging patterns for “t vs N .” 
 
4.3 The OCLEP+ Training and Testing Algorithms 
Given a set S of mined emerging patterns, let minLength(S) denote the 
minimal length of the patterns in S. 
The training algorithm for OCLEP+ will derive just one value: a cutoff value 
for the minimal lengths. For this, k instances t1, ..., tk are randomly drawn from 
N; each will contribute a minimal length value. For each tj, r random samples 
Mi, each containing m instances, are drawn randomly from N − {tj}. The 
minimal jumping emerging patterns from BorderDiff(tj, M1), ...BorderDiff(tj, 
Mr) are collected and used to compute a minimal length mltj. Having r 
invocations of BorderDiff on tj vs r different Mi‘s helps improve the performance 
and robust- ness of the detection system.  The list of the k  minimal lengths from 
the k  tjs are sorted to yield the cutoff value at the pth percentile. 
 
Algorithm 1 OCLEP+ Training 
 
Parameters:  k  (size of T ), m  (size of M ), r  (number of M  per t),  
p (percentile for cutoff value) 
Input: N (dataset of normal instances) 
Output: A cutoff value κ 
(1) Pick a random subset T = {t1, ..., tk} of size k from N 
(2) For each t ∈ T do 
(3) For each i ∈ {1, ..., r} do 
(4) Pick a random subset Mi of size m from N − {t} 
(5) Let P Si be the set of minimal jumping emerging patterns 
computed by BorderDiff(t, Mi) 
(6) End 
(7) Let mlt = min({|P | | P ∈ ∪r P Si) 
(8) End 
(9) Sort the list mlt1, ..., mltk in decreasing order 
(10) Return the cutoff value κ at p-percentile of the sorted list 
 
 
The suitable size m is determined as follows: If N is large, we choose m 
in the range of [200, 800]. If N is not very large, we choose m to be |N|- 1. 
Choosing a larger m allows us to use more instances as background data to  
be compared against t, but more computational time is needed, without the 
3OCLEP used the average length measure. 
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Algorithm 2 OCLEP+ Testing 
 
Parameters: m (size of M), r (number of M), κ (the cutoff value)  
Input: N (dataset of normal instances), x (test instance) 
Output: Is x normal or intruder? 
(1) For each i ∈ {1, ..., r} do 
(2) Pick a random subset Mi of size m from N − {x} 
(3) Let P Si be the minimal jumping emerging patterns 
computed by BorderDiff(x, Mi) 
(4) End 
(5) Let mlx = min({|P | | P ∈ ∪r   P Si) 
(6) If mlx > κ  then classify x  as normal 
(7) Else classify x as intruder 
 
 
benefit of additional discriminative information (compared against smaller m). 
If m is roughly N then the detection system may not be as robust (compared 
against a medium m), as only one set of jumping emerging patterns is available. 
Having m in the hundreds range usually offers good speed-information tradeoff 
and better robustness. In experiments on the NSL-KDD data, parameters for 
OCLEP+ were set as follows: k = 800, m = 400, r = 7, and p = 95%. 
 
5 Experimental Evaluation of OCLEP+ 
In the experiments, parameters for OCLEP+ were set as follows: k = 800, m = 
400, r = 7, and p = 95%. To use pattern mining, the equi-width discretization 
method was used on the numerical attributes. Observe that in one-class training 
we do not have access to the classes. 
OCLEP+ is compared against One Class SVM with linear, polynomial, and 
RBF kernels, and also OCLEP. The reason to choose the above three versions 
of SVM for evaluation is that they are very popular and also they use only  
one class normal data to train the classifier; we do not consider many other 
classifiers and techniques since they use multi-class data (both the normal and 
anomaly classes) to train their classifiers. 
 
5.1 Details of the NSL-KDD Dataset 
The NSL-KDD dataset4 was used to evaluate OCLEP+’s performance. It is an 
improved version of the KDDCUP dataset (available at the UCI Repository); 
the modifications were performed to remove certain design deficiencies of the 
KDDCUP data [21]. KDDCUP was used for the Third International Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition, which was held in conjunction 
with KDD-99; the dataset includes a wide variety of intrusions that are simu- 
4NSL-KDD: http://www.unb.ca/cic/research/datasets/nsl.html 
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lated in a military network environment. Both KDDCUP and NSL-KDD have 
been widely used in evaluating intrusion detection algorithms. 
The instances of NSL-KDD have 41 features. The NSL-KDD dataset 
includes a file (KDDTrain+ 20Percent) that contains both anomaly as well as 
normal instances. For one-class training for OCLEP+, the anomaly instances 
were removed from this file, yielding a one-class training file with 13499 normal 
instances. The KDDTest+ file of NSL-KDD containing 22544 instances (both 
normal and abnormal) was used to evaluate the classifiers. 
 
5.2 Accuracy Measures 
Precision, recall, F-score and accuracy are the metrics we use to compare the 
prediction performance of the algorithms. For any classification algorithm, the 
following four numbers characterize its classification performance: 
• TP: The number of positive instances predicted as positives. 
• FP: The number of negative instances predicted as positives. 
• TN: The number of negative instances predicted as negatives. 
• FN: The number of positive instances predicted as negatives. 
Accuracy is defined as the proportion of the correct results: 
Accuracy = (T P + T N )/(T P + T N + F P + F N ) 
 
Accuracy is not adequate for situations where the two classes are not 
balanced. F-score (below) is widely used for performance evaluation on 
imbalanced data. 
F-score is the harmonic mean of both recall and precision: 
F-score = 2 ∗ (precision ∗ recall)/(precision + recall) 
where  
P recision = T P/(T P + F P ) 
Recall = T P/(T P + F N ) 
 
5.3 Intrusion Detection on NSL-KDD Dataset 
In general, experiments found that OCLEP+ achieved better results than com- 
peting methods on the NSL-KDD dataset. The results are summarized in Ta- 
bles 1 and 2. The tables compare performance of OCLEP+, OCLEP, and one- 
class SVM (using implementation from [5]) with three types of kernels. Table 1 
gives raw counts for the confusion table, whereas Table 2 gives results on several 
accuracy measures. 
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Method TP FP TN FN 
OCLEP+ 9810 1358 8353 3023 
OCLEP 9762 1724 7987 3071 
OneClass SVM: Linear 10615 4593 5118 2218 
OneClass SVM: Poly 10859 4661 5050 1974 
OneClass SVM: RBF 12825 9706 5 8 
 
Table 1: Performance Comparison: Confusion Table 
 
Method Precision Recall F-score Accuracy 
OCLEP+ 87.84 76.44 81.75 80.57 
OCLEP 84.99 76.07 80.28 78.73 
OneClass SVM: Linear 69.80 82.72 75.71 69.79 
OneClass SVM: Poly 69.97 84.62 76.60 70.57 
OneClass SVM: RBF 56.92 99.94 72.53 56.91 
 
Table 2: Performance Comparison on Accuracy Measures 
 
 
5.4 Impact of Parameters 
The OCLEP+ algorithm has three parameters, namely k, r, and m. For a given 
application one should perform cross validation experiments to select the 
optimal parameter values. This section discusses how different values for the 
parameters impact the performance on the NSL-KDD dataset. As will be seen 
below, the optimal results are obtained when k = 800, r = 7 and m = 400. 
The OCLEP+ algorithm used p with default value of 0.95, and the cutoff 
value of the minimal length statistics is 3. Any instance whose minimal length 
statistics is 3 or larger is classified as normal, and it is classified as anomaly 
otherwise. 
 
Impact of k 
We ran experiments with different values of k with fixed values of m = 400 
and r = 7. The results of experiment are shown in Table 3. The experimental 
results show that the optimum result is obtained when k 700.  We  note that 
the minimal length of JEPs is a positive integer for each experiment. Only  
two minimal lengths were selected by OCLEP+ in all experiments reported in 
Table 3, leading to just two possible rows in the table. 
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k TP FP TN FN FPR TPR Prec Reca Fscore Accu 
100 4301 565 9146 8532 0.06 0.34 88.39 33.52 48.60 59.65 
200 4301 565 9146 8532 0.06 0.34 88.39 33.52 48.60 59.65 
300 4301 565 9146 8532 0.06 0.34 88.39 33.52 48.60 59.65 
400 4301 565 9146 8532 0.06 0.34 88.39 33.52 48.60 59.65 
500 4301 565 9146 8532 0.06 0.34 88.39 33.52 48.60 59.65 
600 4301 565 9146 8532 0.06 0.34 88.39 33.52 48.60 59.65 
700 9822 1360 8351 3011 0.14 0.77 87.84 76.54 81.80 80.61 
800 9822 1360 8351 3011 0.14 0.77 87.84 76.54 81.80 80.61 
900 9822 1360 8351 3011 0.14 0.77 87.84 76.54 81.80 80.61 
1000 9822 1360 8351 3011 0.14 0.77 87.84 76.54 81.80 80.61 
 
Table 3: Experimental results: impact by k 
 
 
Impact by r 
We ran experiments with r ranging from 1 to 10 and fixed values of k = 800 
and m = 400. The results of the experiments are shown in Table 4. It can be 
observed that F-score value peaked when r = 7. 
 
r TP FP TN FN FPR TPR Prec Reca Fscore Accu 
1 9127 976 8735 3706 0.10 0.71 90.34 71.12 79.59 79.23 
2 9515 1136 8575 3318 0.12 0.74 89.33 74.14 81.03 80.24 
3 9656 1231 8480 3177 0.13 0.75 88.69 75.24 81.42 80.45 
4 9727 1279 8432 3106 0.13 0.76 88.38 75.80 81.61 80.55 
5 9766 1312 8399 3067 0.14 0.76 88.16 76.10 81.69 80.58 
6 9787 1348 8363 3046 0.14 0.76 87.89 76.26 81.67 80.51 
7 9807 1358 8353 3026 0.14 0.76 87.84 76.42 81.73 80.55 
8 9814 1374 8337 3019 0.14 0.76 87.72 76.47 81.71 80.51 
9 9838 1384 8327 2995 0.14 0.77 87.67 76.66 81.80 80.58 
10 9831 1408 8303 3002 0.14 0.77 87.47 76.61 81.68 80.44 
Table 4: Experimental results: impact by r 
 
 
Impact by m 
We ran experiments with m ranging from 100 to 1000 and fixed values of k = 800 
and r = 7. The results of the experiments are shown in Table 5. It can be 
observed that increasing m leads to worse recall rate but better precision. It 
can also be observed that the F-score is maximum at m = 400. 
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l TP FP TN FN FPR TPR Prec Reca Fscore Accu 
100 10388 3189 6522 2445 0.33 0.81 76.51 80.95 78.67 75.01 
200 9935 2005 7706 2898 0.21 0.77 83.21 77.42 80.21 78.25 
300 9846 1529 8182 2987 0.16 0.77 86.56 76.72 81.35 79.97 
400 9801 1363 8348 3032 0.14 0.76 87.79 76.37 81.69 80.50 
500 9758 1288 8423 3075 0.13 0.76 88.34 76.04 81.73 80.65 
600 9705 1222 8489 3128 0.13 0.76 88.82 75.63 81.69 80.70 
700 9621 1187 8524 3212 0.12 0.75 89.02 74.97 81.39 80.49 
800 9559 1129 8582 3274 0.12 0.74 89.44 74.49 81.28 80.47 
900 9468 1059 8652 3365 0.11 0.74 89.94 73.78 81.06 80.38 
1000 9372 1025 8686 3461 0.11 0.73 90.14 73.03 80.69 80.10 
 
Table 5: Experimental results: impact by m 
 
 
6 Other Methods Using Emerging Patterns 
We note that emerging patterns have also been called contrast patterns in the 
literature. 
Researchers have proposed numerous emerging/contrast pattern based 
methods for classification [13], clustering and clustering quality evaluation [14, 
18], outlier detection [6], gene ranking [19, 20], cancer analysis [17], 
chemoinformatics [2], and pattern aided regression/classification [11, 12]. 
Reference [8] is a collection on the mining and application of 
contrast/emerging patterns. Reference [7] gives a unified coverage of methods 
using emerging patterns, and a wide range of applications of those methods 
(which were reported in hundreds of papers); the book is written from the 
perspective of exploiting the power of group differences. 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
This paper presented the OCLEP+ method for intrusion detection using one- 
class training. The method is based on the use of minimal length of jumping 
emerging patterns. It does not use a mathematical model, and it does not use 
distance metrics. Experiments showed that OCLEP+ outperformed one-class 
SVM with linear, polynomial, and RBF kernels. 
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